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THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENSHIP ON FAMILY INCOME AND POVERTY

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Inhabitants of the United States may be grouped into three broad categories—native-born U.S. citizens (people born in the United States or born abroad to U.S. citizens), naturalized U.S. citizens (people born outside the United States but who have acquired U.S. citizenship), and non-naturalized immigrants (people born outside the United States who have not acquired U.S. citizenship). In 2007, native-born U.S. citizens made up 84.7% of the population, naturalized immigrants made up 6.5%, and non-citizen immigrants made up 8.8%.

To become a naturalized U.S. citizen, a person generally must have been a legal permanent resident of the United States for at least five years, be a person of “good moral character,” pass a test on U.S. history and government, be able to read, write, and speak English, show an attachment to the U.S. Constitution, and take an oath of allegiance to the United States. Once an immigrant becomes a citizen, he or she has all of the benefits of citizenship, including the right to vote, run for federal office (except President), apply for federal grants and scholarships, and apply for jobs restricted to citizens.

The economic benefits of citizenship have been underexplored in our national discussion around immigration. This analysis shows that citizenship status among immigrants is highly correlated with economic outcomes; naturalized immigrants have much higher median incomes (nearly 50% higher in 2007) and much lower poverty rates (more than 10 percentage points lower) than non-citizen immigrants. This raises an important question—how much of this difference is caused by citizenship status alone?

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This question is hard to convincingly answer. As documented below, immigrants who become citizens tend to differ from non-citizen immigrants on many factors related to economic outcomes, including educational attainment, age, country-of-origin, and year of arrival to the United States. These factors, fortunately, are observable in survey data and can be accounted for in empirical studies. The difficulties come from the fact that citizen and non-citizen immigrants may differ in ways that cannot be accounted for, but have significant impact on their economic outcomes. In such cases, it is not citizenship that helps boost an immigrant's economic status, but some other factor (for example, an ability or desire to effectively work the U.S. system) that helps explain both citizenship and economic progress. In other words, it is possible that the difference in economic outcomes between citizen and non-citizen immigrants is largely due to the fact that persons who would have fared better regardless of their citizenship status are more likely to become citizens.

This paper looks at the effect of citizenship on family income and poverty. First, it discusses how citizenship may be related to economic outcomes. Then, using March CPS data covering the years 1993 to 2007, we document trends in immigration, citizenship, and income, look carefully at demographic differences by citizenship status to identify sources of bias in raw comparisons, and then conduct a straightforward regression analysis to control for observable differences between citizen and non-citizen immigrants in an attempt to isolate the effect of citizenship on economic outcomes.

Key findings include:

- In 2007 there were 34.3 million adult immigrants living in the United States. Of this 34.3 million, 14.5 million (or 42.3%) were naturalized U.S. citizens.
- Citizen immigrants tend to have similar economic outcomes to native-born Americans, while non-citizen immigrants tend to have much lower incomes and higher poverty rates.
 - In 2007, adult citizen immigrants had a median family income of \$57,823, slightly higher than that of native-born adult Americans, who had a median family income of \$56,000. Non-citizen adult immigrants had a median income of \$38,600—33.2% below that of citizen immigrants.
 - In 2007, the poverty rate for non-citizen immigrant adults was 20.0%, more than twice the 9.2% rate for adult citizen immigrants and 9.8% rate for adult native-born Americans.
- Citizen and non-citizen immigrants are different on a variety of demographic measures. Citizen immigrants:
 - tend to have higher levels of education;
 - are less likely to be Hispanic;
 - are older;
 - are more likely to be female;
 - are more likely to be married; and
 - are likely to have been in the United States for longer than non-citizen immigrants.
 - Controlling for observable demographic characteristics, the average income of adult citizen immigrants is 14.6% higher, and the poverty rate is 3.0 percentage points lower, than that of adult non-citizen immigrants.
- Citizenship has the largest impact on the outcomes of Hispanics, with the poverty rate of Hispanic citizens being 4.3 percentage points lower than the poverty rate of Hispanic non-citizens.

Results from past studies

Because of the measurement challenge discussed above, the economic benefits of citizenship have been under-explored in our national discussion around immigration. Early studies of the citizenship effect on wage earnings identified some positive correlation between wages and citizenship attainment. Using census data from 1970, Chiswick (1978) presented first evidence of a wage premium for naturalized immigrants, finding that on average naturalized non-natives earned 15% more than their non-naturalized counterparts, though this effect lost statistical significance when he controlled for year of migration.

More recent studies use longitudinal data to compare economic outcomes before and after naturalization. This allows the researcher to control for “individual fixed effects”, or unobservable personal characteristics that are constant over time for an individual that may jointly influence both citizenship and economic status. Bratsberg et al. (2002) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to examine the wages of young immigrants and conclude that citizenship has a highly significant effect on wages and wage growth, particularly for immigrants from less developed countries. In a separate study with 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, Kossoudji (2007) controls for job tenure, work experience, education, urbanicity, immigrant concentration in place of residence, years in the United States, gender, and race, and finds a significant difference in hourly wages for citizen and non-citizen immigrants.

The limited scope of work in this area of immigrant studies prevents the drawing of any strong conclusions. There is a general consensus that naturalization and higher earnings show a positive *correlation*, and there is reasonable evidence, most convincing in the studies using longitudinal data, that an independent effect of citizenship on wages exists. This paper looks not at wages, but at the effect of citizenship on family income and poverty.

How might citizenship relate to economic outcomes?

In Bratsburg et al. (2002), the authors carefully outline how citizenship may be related to economic opportunities. They characterize two primary mechanisms for the citizenship premium: the access to a broader range of better paying jobs, and a reflection of workers’ unobserved productivity-related characteristics.


The access to a broader range of better paying jobs is largely related to access to public-sector jobs, as many federal and state agencies restrict employment to U.S. citizens. Public-sector jobs tend to pay better than private-sector jobs—in 2007, the median wage and salary income of full-time, full-year adult workers with public-sector jobs was \$45,000, 18.4% higher than the \$38,000 median income for full-time workers with private-sector jobs. In 2007, 13.3% of adult citizen immigrant workers held public-sector jobs, compared to 4.7% of adult non-citizen immigrant workers. Even after controlling for observable factors including age, education, race/ethnicity, gender, marital status, years in country, and country of origin, adult citizen immigrant workers are still 4.3 percentage points more likely to hold public-sector jobs than adult non-citizen immigrant workers.

Citizenship may also lead to better job access because some employers may prefer to hire citizen immigrants over non-citizen immigrants either because of outright discrimination against non-citizens, the perceived reduced likelihood of facing sanctions from employing illegal immigrants, the greater ease with which U.S. passport holders can travel abroad (which matters in jobs that involve international travel), or a belief that citizen immigrants are better workers to invest in because they may be less likely to return to their home country. Furthermore, any employer preference for citizens over non-citizens is easily translated into differential hiring practices because it is legal to discriminate in hiring based on U.S. citizenship.

The other main channel through which citizens may have better economic outcomes may be through unobserved productivity characteristics that are related both to attaining citizenship and economic progress. A case in point is the fact that the decision to naturalize may reflect an immigrant’s decision to stay in the United States and invest in U.S.-

FIGURE A

Immigrant share of adult population by nativity, 1993-2007




SOURCE: Author's analysis of March CPS data.

specific human capital. “In this scenario, higher wages of those who naturalize result not from citizenship but from the preceding commitment to remain in the United States and to acquire additional skills valued in the U.S. labor market” (Bratsburg et al. 2002).

Trends in immigration, citizenship, and income

The overall immigrant share of the adult population grew from 10.6% in 1993 to 15.3% in 2007, so that in 2007 there were 34.3 million adult immigrants living in the United States. Of this 34.3 million, 14.5 million (or 42.3%) were naturalized U.S. citizens. By comparison, in 1993, only one-third of all adult immigrants were naturalized citizens; the number of citizen immigrants in the United States has risen much faster than the number of non-citizen immigrants in recent years. Between 1993 and 2007, the citizen-immigrant share of the adult population grew 3 percentage points, from 3.5% to 6.5%, whereas the non-citizen immigrant share of the population grew only 1.8 percentage points, from 7.0% to 8.8% (Figure A). If these relative growth rates continue, by 2020 over half of all immigrants in this country will be naturalized citizens.

FIGURE B**Real median family income by nativity for adults, 1993-2007**

SOURCE: Author's analysis of March CPS data.

The disparities in economic outcomes between citizen and non-citizen immigrants are large. Citizen immigrants tend to have very similar economic outcomes to native-born Americans, while non-citizen immigrants tend to have much lower incomes and higher poverty rates. In 2007, adult citizen immigrants had a median family income of \$57,823, 3.3% higher than that of native-born adult Americans, who had a median family income of \$56,000 (Figure B). Non-citizen adult immigrants, however, had a median income of \$38,600—33.2% below that of citizen immigrants.


The disparities between citizen and non-citizen immigrants show up not just at the median, but also at the low end of the income scale. While non-citizen immigrants saw large declines in poverty during the strong labor market of the 1990s, their poverty rates remain much higher than the other two groups (Figure C). In 2007, the poverty rate for non-citizen adults was 20.0%, more than twice the 9.2% rate for adult citizen immigrants and 9.8% rate for adult native-born Americans.

How do citizen immigrants compare to non-citizen immigrants demographically?

As described above, much of the difference in income and poverty between citizen and non-citizen immigrants can be attributed to the fact that the members of these two groups are different along other measures that are correlated with

FIGURE C

Poverty rate of adult population by nativity, 1993-2007



SOURCE: Author's analysis of March CPS data.

income. **Table 1** presents demographic breakdowns by nativity, along with overall income and poverty levels, to help illustrate this fact.

One-third of citizen immigrants have a college degree or more, compared to only 21% of non-citizen immigrants. Furthermore, less than 20% of citizen immigrants lack a high school degree, whereas nearly 40% of non-citizen immigrants lack a high school degree. As the table also shows, education levels are highly correlated with income and poverty, so at least part of the income differences between citizens and non-citizens can be attributed to differences in education levels.

Nearly 60% of citizen immigrants are either Asian or non-Hispanic whites, compared to around a third of non-citizen immigrants. And the percentages are almost exactly flipped when considering Hispanics—nearly 60% of non-citizen immigrants are Hispanic, compared to around a third of citizen immigrants. Since Asians and non-Hispanic whites have higher incomes and lower poverty rates relative to Hispanics, different racial and ethnic concentrations by citizenship status will contribute to different income and poverty outcomes for citizens and non-citizens.

Age also plays a role—non-citizen immigrants tend to be younger, with, for example, 28.8% being between 18 and 29, compared to only 11.0% of citizen immigrants. Since this group has lower income and higher poverty, this will also

TABLE 1

Demographics by nativity

	Citizen immigrant	Non-citizen immigrant	Native	Overall real median family income	Overall poverty rate
Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
<i>Less than high school</i>	19.7	39.8	11.7	\$29,000	24.4%
<i>High school</i>	26.1	25.1	32.2	44,263	11.8
<i>Some college</i>	20.8	14.1	29.5	58,000	8.4
<i>Bachelors degree</i>	20.9	13.2	17.9	80,292	4.4
<i>Advanced degree</i>	12.5	7.8	8.7	102,837	3.0
Race/Ethnicity	100.0	100.0	100.0		
<i>White non-Hispanic</i>	29.9	15.5	77.5	60,051	7.6
<i>Black non-Hispanic</i>	8.6	6.5	12.0	38,050	20.1
<i>Hispanic</i>	31.8	59.2	7.2	40,106	17.7
<i>Asian</i>	29.3	18.6	1.4	70,000	9.6
<i>Other</i>	0.4	0.2	1.9	45,000	17.0
Age	100.0	100.0	100.0		
<i>18-29</i>	11.0	28.8	22.1	47,000	15.6
<i>30-49</i>	40.4	50.7	36.1	62,731	9.6
<i>50+</i>	48.7	20.5	41.8	49,537	8.9
Gender	100.0	100.0	100.0		
<i>Male</i>	45.9	53.1	48.1	57,048	8.8
<i>Female</i>	54.1	46.9	51.9	51,000	12.4
Marital status	100.0	100.0	100.0		
<i>Married, spouse present</i>	66.9	60.8	54.1	71,080	5.4
<i>Other</i>	33.1	39.2	45.9	35,215	17.2

SOURCE: Author's analysis of March CPS data.

affect income and poverty outcomes by citizenship status. Gender is the one demographic factor in this table where non-citizen immigrants are concentrated in a higher-earning group—53.1% of non-citizen immigrants are men, compared to only 45.9% of citizen immigrants. Since women have lower incomes and higher poverty rates, this will affect income and poverty outcomes by nativity. Higher marriage rates among citizen immigrants, on the other hand, contribute to citizen immigrants' higher income and lower poverty rates, as being married with a spouse present is correlated with better economic outcomes. Note that both citizen and non-citizen immigrants have significantly higher marriage rates than native-born U.S. adults.

Another important factor in the differences in outcomes between citizen and non-citizen immigrants is how long each group has been in the country. **Table 2** shows income and poverty rates for immigrants by the year of arrival in the United States. Incomes are much higher and poverty rates lower for immigrants who have been in the United States longer. Nearly three-quarters of citizen immigrants have been in the country since the 1980s or earlier; by comparison, nearly three-quarters of non-citizen immigrants arrived in 1990 or later. Some of this difference has to do with the fact that generally an immigrant is not eligible for citizenship until he or she has been in the country for five years. However,

even if we restrict the sample to those who arrived before the year 2000, big disparities remain, with less than a quarter (23.9%) of these citizen immigrants arriving in the 1990s, while well over half (57.7%) of these non-citizen immigrants arriving in the 1990s. Year of entry may also be related to a number of other demographic variables, including country of origin, as immigrant flows from different sending countries vary over time.

TABLE 2

Year of entry and country of origin by nativity

	Citizen immigrant	Non-citizen immigrant	Overall real median family income	Overall poverty rate
Year of arrival	100.0%	100.0%		
<i>1969 or earlier</i>	21.9	3.4	\$44,759	9.2%
<i>1970-79</i>	20.9	5.3	58,000	9.7
<i>1980-89</i>	30.3	16.8	51,789	12.9
<i>1990-95</i>	15.9	17.6	47,305	14.6
<i>1996-99</i>	7.0	17.1	44,360	16.1
<i>2000-03</i>	2.9	22.1	37,023	18.9
<i>2004 or later</i>	1.1	17.7	34,500	24.3
Country of origin	100.0	100.0		
<i>India</i>	4.4	4.5	87,444	6.8
<i>Taiwan</i>	1.6	0.5	83,307	9.3
<i>Philippines</i>	6.9	2.9	82,569	4.5
<i>Canada</i>	2.1	1.7	67,897	7.7
<i>Vietnam</i>	4.8	1.3	66,370	10.7
<i>Korea</i>	2.5	1.8	60,050	13.4
<i>Iran</i>	1.8	0.4	60,000	6.5
<i>Russia</i>	1.6	0.7	56,000	8.2
<i>China</i>	4.4	3.8	55,738	12.8
<i>Poland</i>	1.6	0.9	52,003	5.9
<i>Columbia</i>	1.9	1.5	51,418	11.3
<i>Germany</i>	2.2	0.8	50,040	8.3
<i>Italy</i>	2.3	0.6	50,000	9.5
<i>Jamaica</i>	2.3	1.1	45,600	15.2
<i>Cuba</i>	3.4	2.2	41,000	16.2
<i>Haiti</i>	1.6	1.0	40,708	18.5
<i>El Salvador</i>	2.0	3.2	38,050	12.6
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	2.3	2.2	36,044	25.7
<i>Mexico</i>	16.1	41.1	34,002	22.0
<i>Honduras</i>	0.7	1.8	33,000	19.3
<i>Guatemala</i>	0.9	2.7	28,805	20.7
<i>Elsewhere</i>	32.6	23.4	53,200	11.6

NOTE: Countries listed include all nations where at least 1.5% of either group of immigrants (citizens or non-citizens) originate.

SOURCE: Author's analysis of March CPS data.

TABLE 3

Regression results

	Dependent variable: Natural log of real family income	Dependent variable: Poverty
Model with no controls	0.533*** (0.020)	-0.0985*** (0.004)
Model with basic set of controls	0.333*** (0.022)	-0.0559*** (0.004)
Full model	0.146*** (0.023)	-0.0298*** (0.004)
Full model, restricted samples		
<i>Women</i>	0.173*** (0.033)	-0.0317*** (0.006)
<i>Men</i>	0.117*** (0.033)	-0.0304*** (0.006)
<i>High school or less</i>	0.114*** (0.033)	-0.0389*** (0.007)
<i>Greater than high school</i>	0.134*** (0.033)	-0.0164*** (0.006)
<i>White non-Hispanic</i>	0.132** (0.053)	-0.0255*** (0.010)
<i>Black non-Hispanic</i>	0.0557 (0.090)	-0.0175 (0.017)
<i>Hispanic</i>	0.140*** (0.033)	-0.0428*** (0.007)
<i>Asian</i>	0.133** (0.052)	-0.00584 (0.009)

NOTE:

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 1% level, two indicate significance at the 5% level, one indicates significance at the 10% level.

Basic set of controls includes age, age squared, education dummies, gender, marital status, race/ethnicity dummies, urbanicity, and state dummies. Full models includes the basic set plus dummies for year of arrival and country of origin.

SOURCE: Author's analysis of March CPS data.

The country an immigrant comes from can play a big role in income and poverty outcomes, as, for example, education, training, and opportunities for transferrable labor market experience vary widely by country of origin. Table 2 shows income and poverty rates for U.S. immigrants by country of origin. Citizen immigrants are more likely to come from the Philippines, Vietnam, Italy, Germany, and Iran; 18.1% of citizen immigrants come from these five countries, compared to 6.0% of non-citizen immigrants. Immigrants from these countries also tend to have higher median incomes and/or lower poverty rates. Another primary difference can be seen by looking at another four countries—Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Less than one-fifth (19.6%) of citizen immigrants come from these four countries, but nearly half (48.7%) of non-citizen immigrants come from these countries. Immigrants from these countries tend to have lower incomes and higher poverty rates than immigrants from other countries, so non-citizen concentration from these countries of origin will have an impact on income and poverty outcomes by citizenship status.

What is the effect of citizenship?

To attempt to identify the independent effect of citizenship on the economic outcomes of immigrants, this study conducts a straightforward regression analysis. The regression results, presented in **Table 3**, provide some support for the claim that, all else equal, naturalized citizens have higher incomes and lower poverty rates than non-citizen immigrants. The first row shows raw differences in average income and poverty between the two groups using pooled 2006 and 2007 March CPS data. The average income of adult citizen immigrants is 53.3% higher, and the poverty rate 9.9 percentage points lower, than that of adult non-citizen immigrants. However, as Table 1 shows, there are many demographic differences between these two groups that may be contributing much of the disparity. The second row controls

for all of the variables in Table 1 (education, race/ethnicity, age, gender, and marital status), along with urbanicity and state of residence. Thus, the analysis compares naturalized and non-naturalized adult immigrants on their income and poverty status, controlling for a set of predictors. Essentially, this simple method asks whether the citizen premium holds up within narrow cells. Once we include these controls, we find that the average income of adult citizen immigrants is 33.3% higher, and the poverty rate 5.6 percentage points lower, than that of adult non-citizen immigrants.

Table 2 showed that a final set of predictors merits possible inclusion—year of entry into the United States and country of origin. As expected given the analysis in Table 2, once we also include these variables, the coefficient on the citizen variable is further reduced. In the full model, we find that the average income of adult citizen immigrants is 14.6% higher, and the poverty rate 3.0 percentage points lower, than that of adult non-citizen immigrants. (A table with complete results from these regressions can be found in the Appendix.)

Finally, Table 2 presents results using the full model (i.e., controlling for all factors mentioned above), but with restricted samples, to investigate whether the effect is different on different subgroups of the population. Citizenship appears to have a larger effect on average income for women than for men, as the average income of female citizens is 17.3% higher than for female non-citizens, while the average income of male citizens is 11.7% higher than for male non-citizens. However, this gender difference is not statistically significant in this model. For people with a maximum education level of a high school degree, citizenship has a statistically significant higher poverty-reducing impact, with the poverty rate of “high school or less” citizens being 3.9 percentage points lower than the poverty rate of “high school or less” non-citizens, while the poverty rate of “more than high school” citizens being 1.6 percentage points lower than the poverty rate of “more than high school” non-citizens.

Looking at the race and ethnicity breakdowns, we find that citizenship has the largest impact on the outcomes of Hispanics, with the poverty rate of Hispanic citizens being 4.3 percentage points lower than the poverty rate of Hispanic non-citizens, which is statistically significantly higher than the impact of citizenship on non-Hispanics. The statistically insignificant outcomes for non-Hispanic blacks are likely due to small sample sizes—non-Hispanic blacks make up only 7% of all immigrants (compared to 48% for Hispanics of any race, 23% for Asians, and 21% for white non-Hispanics).

Conclusion

The figures at the beginning of this paper show that citizen immigrants have much better economic outcomes than non-citizen immigrants. How much of those differences can be attributed to citizenship status itself? There is an inherent “endogeneity” problem in any attempt to answer that question, namely that citizen and non-citizen immigrants are different on a wide variety of measures that are also related to income and poverty, making it difficult to isolate the impact of citizenship. The approach we use to identify the independent effect of citizenship on economic outcomes is admittedly limited—we simply control for the many observable characteristics that are available in the CPS, including education, race/ethnicity, age, gender, marital status, year of entry into the United States, and country of origin, among others. Unfortunately, however, we are unable to control for unobservable characteristics that affect both citizenship and economic progress—like inherent skills, an ability or desire to effectively work the system, or personal connections. Thus, these results should be viewed as indicative of correlation more than of causation.

Once we control for observable characteristics, we find that the average income of adult citizen immigrants is 14.6% higher, and the poverty rate 3.0 percentage points lower, than that of adult non-citizen immigrants. More work is also needed to rigorously establish how much citizenship has a causal effect on the economic outcomes of immigrants. However, if the results presented here hold up, it should encourage policy initiatives that create a path to citizenship, as such a path can be a key factor in reducing poverty and opening the door to economic stability for a broad swath of immigrant families.

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Appendix

TABLE A 1

Full regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Natural log of real family income	(2) Natural log of real family income	(3) Natural log of real family income	(4) Poverty	(5) Poverty	(6) Poverty
<i>Citizen dummy</i>	0.533*** (0.0203)	0.333*** (0.0223)	0.146*** (0.0234)	-0.0985*** (0.00368)	-0.0559*** (0.00393)	-0.0298*** (0.00446)
<i>Exactly High School dummy</i>		0.229*** (0.0280)	0.212*** (0.0281)		-0.0782*** (0.00568)	-0.0720*** (0.00572)
<i>Some College dummy</i>		0.480*** (0.0324)	0.435*** (0.0335)		-0.117*** (0.00614)	-0.106*** (0.00633)
<i>BA dummy</i>		0.657*** (0.0337)	0.653*** (0.0348)		-0.131*** (0.00622)	-0.125*** (0.00648)
<i>Advanced Degree dummy</i>		0.896*** (0.0401)	0.915*** (0.0422)		-0.142*** (0.00655)	-0.137*** (0.00697)
<i>Asian dummy</i>		-0.0654** (0.0323)	0.115 (0.0823)		0.0247*** (0.00513)	-0.00111 (0.0126)
<i>Black non-Hispanic dummy</i>		-0.101** (0.0459)	-0.110 (0.0818)		0.0558*** (0.00867)	0.0426*** (0.0142)
<i>Hispanic dummy</i>		-0.159*** (0.0314)	-0.127 (0.0822)		0.0417*** (0.00534)	0.0287* (0.0148)
<i>Age</i>		0.0265*** (0.00414)	0.0104** (0.00443)		-0.00320*** (0.000738)	-0.00157** (0.000792)
<i>Age squared</i>		-0.000289*** (4.05e-05)	-0.000164*** (4.42e-05)		2.77e-05*** (7.39e-06)	1.95e-05** (8.04e-06)
<i>Female dummy</i>		-0.117*** (0.0204)	-0.125*** (0.0203)		0.0397*** (0.00372)	0.0413*** (0.00369)
<i>Married dummy</i>		0.719*** (0.0253)	0.726*** (0.0252)		-0.0717*** (0.00452)	-0.0737*** (0.00452)
<i>Urban dummy</i>		0.471*** (0.0796)	0.487*** (0.0776)		-0.0380*** (0.0108)	-0.0387*** (0.0106)
<i>State dummies</i>	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Year-of-entry dummies</i>	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
<i>Country-of-origin dummies</i>	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
<i>Constant</i>	10.21*** (0.0188)	8.754*** (0.129)	9.050*** (0.152)	0.196*** (0.00342)	0.355*** (0.0207)	0.343*** (0.0261)
<i>Observations</i>	45510	45510	45510	45510	45510	45510
<i>R-squared</i>	0.020	0.107	0.133	0.019	0.073	0.092

NOTE:

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 1% level, two indicate significance at the 5% level, one indicates significance at the 10% level.

The omitted education dummy is "Less than high school" and the omitted race/ethnicity dummy is "White, non-Hispanic." In addition to what is shown in the table, all models include a dummy for "year 2006" (since pooled 2006 and 2007 data were used).

SOURCE: Author's analysis of March CPS data.

References

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